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INTRODUCTION
Few things focus the mind on lessons learned from past experience more than
the urgent need to address the same problem again. The threat that white
supremacist terrorists pose to the United States today is of course different in
some respects from the threat Al Qaeda terrorists posed in 2001. Most (but not
all) Al Qaeda terrorists who threatened the United States were foreign nationals.
Most (but not all) white supremacists who threaten us now were born here in the
United States. The Al Qaeda of 2001 enjoyed the availability of an effective jurisdictional haven in Afghanistan from which to plan and launch its operations.
White supremacist terrorists operating in the United States, even as they enjoyed
a degree of official government celebration during the Trump presidency, do not
have the same unchecked autonomy here. The U.S. President and much of the
foreign policy establishment in 2001 saw Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks principally as
Al Qaeda itself saw them: “an act of war,” demanding a U.S. military response.1
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of some among far-right extremist groups who
believe themselves engaged in the opening volleys of a second civil war, the
overwhelming focus of the U.S. government response to date has been through
domestic law enforcement.
Yet the parallels are also unmistakable. Consider just a few. Soon after the
September 11 attacks, U.S. government law enforcement and intelligence agencies began describing Al Qaeda as the most urgent security threat facing the

* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, and Co-Director,
Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy. © 2021, Deborah Pearlstein.
1. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the U.S. Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347-1348 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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United States.2 In February 2021, after the Capitol Insurrection of January 6,
Alejandro Mayorkas, the newly confirmed Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (the agency created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks) similarly described domestic violent extremists as the “most lethal” terrorism-related
threat facing the U.S. homeland today.3 The U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11
was profoundly shaped by the emergency moment in which it arose; post-9/11
policies were conceived as part of a temporary state of exception necessary to
combat an immediate crisis. (This, notwithstanding the reality that Al Qaedastyle extremism had been a growing danger for years by 9/11, the group having
already carried out multiple violent attacks against U.S. targets before 2001.) The
government’s post-1/6 response is still taking shape, but there has been a notable
shift in the urgency of the rhetoric about far-right extremism in the United States.
As the Director of Washington, D.C.’s Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency told Congress on February 4, “[t]he threats we now face are
arguably as dangerous as they were in the immediate post-9/11 environment.”4
(This, too, notwithstanding the persistence of white supremacist violence in the
United States from the earliest days of our history to the already years-long resurgence since the 2008 election of Barack Obama.5) Likewise, in the weeks following 9/11, long before any investigatory commission had been constituted, much
less made findings and recommendations about what went wrong, policymakers
and scholars of both parties envisioned a response that looked first and foremost
to law, to the anticipated need to sacrifice some liberty for more power. “When
you’re at war, civil liberties are treated differently,” said Senate Republican
Leader Trent Lott.6 “[W]e’re not going to have all the openness and freedom we
have had,” Senate Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt agreed.7 Today, equally
uncertain about the findings (or even existence) of an authoritative commission
investigation into the events of 1/6, legislators of both parties have backed a new
federal law criminalizing the offense of “domestic terrorism,”8 and civil rights
groups are among those leading calls for more restrictions on hateful speech

2. See, e.g., Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing before the
S. Select Comm. on Intel., 107th Cong. 597 (2002) (testimony of CIA Dir. George Tenet).
3. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, How My DHS Will Combat Domestic Extremism, WASH. POST (Feb. 25,
2021), https://perma.cc/5FUV-9JYM.
4. Examining the Domestic Terrorism Threat in the Wake of the Attack on the U.S. Capitol: Hearing
before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 117th Cong. 1 (2021) (statement of Christopher Rodriguez,
Dir., D.C. Homeland Sec. and Emergency Mgmt. Agency).
5. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr., Andrew Ba Tran & Derek Hawkins, The Rise of Domestic
Extremism in America, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/U55G-PKG3 (citing CSIS
Domestic Terrorism Dataset used by the Washington Post, GITHUB, https://perma.cc/A6SX-94PE (last
updated April 14, 2021)).
6. Eric Pianin & Thomas B. Edsall, Civil Liberties Debate Revived Amid Efforts to Fight Terrorism,
WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2001), https://perma.cc/C6AW-PVA2.
7. Id.
8. Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act, H.R. 350, 117th Cong. § 3(a) (2021).
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online.9 These are legal solutions for a multi-dimensional problem, which is at
best only partially susceptible to law.
Such conceptually defining characteristics of the early U.S. response to the
attacks of 9/11 — seeing the threat as more acute rather than chronic, seeking
new legal power before assessing whether a lack of power bore any causal connection to the failure to foresee or repel the attack — helped give rise to some of
the most misguided practices of the post-9/11 era. Detainee torture and abuse, the
embrace of trial by newly formed military commission — these policies and practices were set in motion in the first few weeks after the 9/11 attacks, driven by the
instinct to do something, bolstered by the assumption that such policy adaptations
would be short-lived, and untethered by any systematic analysis of the longerterm consequences for policy, democracy, or law — or even by any contemplated
end state. Yet nearing twenty years on, as Guantanamo detentions continue, and
associated military commissions still struggle over what can lawfully be done
with defendants or witnesses who were subject to torture in U.S. custody, these
lessons now seem apparent. This essay suggests that it is possible to see how
these misguided conceptual frameworks helped lead us down badly mistaken policy pathways. And it cautions against similar missteps as we accelerate along the
new road ahead.
I. THE GOAL ISN’T JUST SECURITY IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY, IT’S SECURE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY
The CIA’s post-9/11 detention program, under which CIA imprisoned and tortured dozens of terrorist suspects in secret locations around the world, is perhaps
the post-9/11 poster child for the perils of shoot-first-ask-questions-later decision-making. Government officials involved in the program have since described
its origins in a time of deep grief and guilt over the failure to prevent the attacks
of 9/11, fear over the prospect of future attacks, and intense pressure from political leaders to prevent the next one from happening. Outside government, wildly
popular TV shows like “24” about fictional counterterrorism agent Jack Bauer,
which aired from 2001-2010, celebrated the effectiveness of torture as an essential interrogation device in responding to the perennial “ticking bomb” in need of
disarming. And for years after 2001, scholars in law, political science, and other
disciplines focused their attention on the challenges of emergency response,

9. See, e.g., ADL CEO Tells Congress: Adopt New Law to Fight Hate, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/KV7P-8DKA (urging Congress to put more pressure on social media
companies to “shut down the neo-Nazis and anti-Semites on their platforms.”); SPLC’s Lecia Brooks:
Congress Must Take Urgent Steps To Prevent Hate Groups From Raising Money Online, S. POVERTY L.
CTR. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/6YHC-DLKB (urging “corporations to create – and enforce –
policies and terms of service to ensure that social media platforms, payment service providers, and other
internet-based services do not provide platforms where hateful activities and extremism can grow and
lead to domestic terrorism.”).
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embracing the prevailing assumption that counterterrorism policy is primarily
about government decision-making when time is of the essence.10
The effects of this emergency-driven focus, and the haste with which the CIA
program was assembled, became publicly apparent years later. As has since been
extensively documented in government investigations, the CIA developed the
detention program fully aware that it had no relevant knowledge or experience in
operating prison facilities. CIA records reveal no evidence that CIA ever consulted other federal agencies that did have such experience and no indication CIA
conducted any research into effective interrogation techniques, relying instead on
independent contractors who likewise lacked any actual interrogation experience.
Above all, from the time the President authorized the CIA to begin detaining and
interrogating terrorist suspects six days after the 9/11 attacks until the Defense
Department was finally persuaded to take custody of the prisoners remaining in
CIA custody in 2006, the U.S. government had no identified “endgame” for what
to do with any of the detainees held in CIA custody after CIA had concluded its
interrogations. CIA had a plan, such as it was, for gathering short-term, emergency-relevant information. It had no plan for whether, once it had finished torturing detainees, it should let the detainees go, hand them over to someone else,
or continue to detain them for the rest of their lives. There was no conception of
what the world would look like once the particular terrorist “emergency” had
passed.11
Among many lessons to be drawn from this experience: not letting the
response to acute danger swamp the development or compromise the success of
long-term policy. Like radical Islamist extremism, white supremacist extremism
– present in the United States in one form or another since the founding – seems
exceedingly unlikely to vanish or be defeated altogether. As they have since the
Civil War, a majority of Americans continue to share the goal of achieving in this
country a sustainable, multiracial democracy. Whatever their potential short-term
benefit, how would new restrictions on “dangerous” or hateful speech, or new
criminal offenses that appear designed to (or do) target individuals based on
group association or ideological beliefs (however repugnant) contribute to that
goal?
As other countries riven by internal division have painfully learned, repressing
hateful speech can eliminate a less-violent outlet for airing grievances that can
help alleviate pressure toward violent conduct even in otherwise stable societies.
And such policies can readily be turned against otherwise non-threatening groups
when political administrations shift. More, overly aggressive restrictions can produce further radicalization, accelerating rather than forestalling a cycle of violence. Less than a decade on in America’s post-9/11 response, it had already

10. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND
THE COURTS 56 (2007); BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 3-4, 13-14 (2006).
11. See S. REP. NO. 113-288, at xi-xxv (2014).
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become clear to national security professionals that this was precisely the path we
had taken. As one veteran counterintelligence interrogator put it:
I learned in Iraq that the No. 1 reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight
were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. Our policy of torture was directly and swiftly recruiting fighters for al-Qaeda in Iraq . . . It’s no
exaggeration to say that at least half of our losses and casualties in that country
have come at the hands of foreigners who joined the fray because of our program of detainee abuse.12

Today, there seems no sensible path forward in embracing new legal restrictions on white supremacist activities that does not involve detailed, concrete analysis of how the population likely to bear the brunt of these new restrictions can be
expected to respond in the even slightly-longer term.
II. DON’T SUBSTITUTE LEGAL POWER FOR LONG-TERM POLICY
Washington policymakers were not alone in the first weeks after 9/11 in leaping to conclude that an insufficient degree of federal power was to blame for the
United States’ catastrophic failure to prevent the attacks – and that an expansion
of legal authority would thus be indispensable in preventing another. Indeed, academics were among those leading the charge. As Harvard human rights scholar
Michael Ignatieff wrote on September 13: “As America awakens to the reality of
being at war - and permanently so - with an enemy that has as yet no face and no
name, it must ask itself what balance it should keep between liberty and security
in the battle with terrorism.”13 For academics who had long sought to champion
expansive views of executive power, the moment presented an extraordinary opportunity to advance the cause: “[T]he institutional structures that work to the
advantage of the courts and Congress during normal times greatly hamper their
effectiveness in emergencies . . . [D]eference to [the executive] should increase in
emergencies.”14
Yet as the invaluable report of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission soon showed, a
surfeit of civil liberties was not the primary (or even secondary) reason the terrorists succeeded on September 11. Among many examples of non-law-related failures, FBI agents in Minneapolis failed to search terrorist suspect Zacarias
Moussaoui’s computer before the attacks not because constitutional restrictions
against unreasonable searches and seizures prevented them from doing so, but
because they misunderstood the tools the law provided. The vast majority of the
September 11 hijackers were able to enter the United States not because anti-discrimination laws prevented border officials from targeting Arab and Muslim men
for special scrutiny, but because, according to the Commission, “[b]efore 9/11,
12. Matthew Alexander, I’m Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2008),
https://perma.cc/J8NR-MWTA.
13. Michael Ignatieff, Paying for Security with Liberty, FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 13, 2001).
14. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 10, at 6.
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no agency of the U.S. government systematically analyzed terrorists’ travel strategies” to reveal how terrorists had “detectably exploit[ed] weaknesses in our border security.”15
But accrue power the government did, well before it developed a discernable
counterterrorism strategy, with Congress enacting a series of new statutes and the
executive issuing a raft of orders creating new legal powers. Among the many
new powers rapidly asserted was an executive authority to create a new system of
military commissions, designed to compensate for the (presumed) inadequacy of
civilian criminal or even ordinary military trials in order to provide “swift and
certain” justice for the prosecutable among the “worst of the worst” who would
come to be held at Guantanamo Bay.16 As the record of the past 20 years has long
since made clear, justice via military commission has been neither swift nor certain. Seven defendants still await trial by military commission, including Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, the one living man perhaps most responsible for the attacks
of 9/11. All seven cases are still only in pre-trial proceedings; all seven defendants were subject to torture in U.S. custody.17 Neither, it has long since become
apparent, was such a special authority necessary. As the Supreme Court noted in
striking down the original commissions in 2006, the government had offered no
particular reason why it would be “impracticable” simply to try post-9/11 defendants under long-existing statutory rules for courts martial.18 Indeed, between
2001-2018, military commissions produced eight terrorism convictions (several
of which were overturned); during the same period, more than 660 were convicted of terrorism-related charges in federal civilian criminal courts.19 Yet laws
and legal institutions, once created, develop a powerful, self-sustaining force of
their own. While the commissions’ failures were certainly apparent by 2009, ordinary political unwillingness to appear anything less than tough on terrorism,
combined with bureaucratic inertia and government-wide knowledge of the time,
money, professional and political reputations already invested, persuaded a new
administration to double down on commission trials. And the cost of the initial
rush to replace hard policy choices with raw legal power was compounded.
The bipartisan growth of calls post-1/6 for a new federal domestic terrorism
law feels, in this sense, troublingly familiar. The U.S. Code already features a robust set of federal hate crimes laws, and the ACLU has identified more than fifty
statutes already on the books relating to domestic terrorism and material support

15. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S, THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT 384
(2004).
16. Katharine Q. Seelye, Some Guantánamo Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 23, 2002), https://perma.cc/N5XC-BA62 (quoting U.S. Def. Sec’y Donald Rumsfeld).
17. Sarah Almukhtar, Carol Rosenberg et al., The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2021),
https://perma.cc/4ZMR-W29A.
18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 622-624 (2006).
19. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRYING TERROR SUSPECTS IN CIVILIAN COURTS (Feb. 2018), https://
perma.cc/V6ZQ-AMAV.
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for it.20 Rather than identifying specific gaps in the criminal code that might allow
particular individuals who should be prosecuted to escape sanction, supporters of
adding the new crime argue more that its absence “limits our societal condemnation of the defendants and their dangerous ideologies.”21 It is not enough to prosecute a perpetrator for crimes against federal property, the argument goes;
effective measures against white supremacist violence require that “[j]uries,
judges and the public . . . pass judgment on the conduct as terrorism.”22 Yet while
there is little doubt that law can sometimes play an essential expressive function
in this sense, there is reason to worry that the application of such laws might have
the effect of elevating or encouraging extremist groups as much as deter and prevent them from acting, especially in the post-1/6 universe in which public perception of the attack is still so sharply informed by partisan political allegiance.23 As
it stands, with data still extremely limited about the extent of the problem (the
result of years of inattention and the absence of an effective uniform system of
hate crimes reporting), it is nearly impossible to make a persuasive case that such
a new law is necessary to fill some otherwise unfulfilled criminal gap. It is an
ideal moment to let reasoned policy drive any reforms in law – not the other way
around.
III. RULES CAN BE CHANGED BY PEN, THEY CAN ONLY BE APPLIED BY PEOPLE
Among the most searing images to come out of U.S. detention operations post9/11 were those of young American soldiers at the U.S. prison facility in Abu
Ghraib, Iraq, posing with prisoners who they had humiliated, beaten, or worse.
One young woman in those pictures, 19-year-old Private Lynndie England, was
among very few U.S. personnel ever held accountable for what became the widespread abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. Sentenced to three years in prison,
England was a junior member of a reservist military police unit deployed to Iraq
wildly unprepared for the vast detention responsibility it had been given. She was
also influenced by the example of her senior officer (and romantic partner)
Charles Graner, who did have detention experience, but largely as a guard with
an already extensive record of abusing civilian prisoners back home. England and
Graner were ultimately punished.24 But they were also, by any measure, only the
tip of a frighteningly large iceberg.

20. MICHAEL GERMAN & SARAH ROBINSON, WRONG PRIORITIES ON FIGHTING TERRORISM 6-7 (Oct.
31, 2018), https://perma.cc/KVL8-4S84.
21. Richard B. Zabel, Domestic Terrorism Is a National Problem. It Should Also Be a Federal
Crime., WASH. POST, (Feb. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/E6YJ-LJB6.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 3. Views on the rioting at the U.S. Capitol, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://perma.cc/2KGL-A43C; Most Voters Who Incorrectly Say Trump ‘Definitely’ Won the Election
Say He Bears No Responsibility for Capitol Riot, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 14, 2021), https://perma.
cc/JD84-XDGD.
24. See David S. Cloud, Private Found Guilty in Abu Ghraib Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2005),
https://perma.cc/BNP7-E5AJ.
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By 2006, with U.S. troops still engaged in Afghanistan and near the height of
their numbers in Iraq, there had been more than 330 cases in which U.S. military
and civilian personnel were credibly alleged to have abused or killed detainees –
cases involving more than 600 U.S. personnel and more than 460 U.S.-held
detainees.25 The numbers included some 100-plus detainees who died in U.S. custody, including 34 whose deaths the Department of Defense (DOD) reported as
homicides, and eight who had been tortured to death.26 Yet notwithstanding the
scope of the problem – a problem both U.S. and international investigations by
then recognized had its roots in gross failures of policy and leadership – formal
accountability for official criminal behavior rarely rose much above the most junior participants involved. It was surely right to hold England, Graner, and other
individuals who played a role in post-9/11 detainee abuse, accountable for their
conduct after the fact. It would have been far better to have had a robust system
of vetting, education, training, and professionalization that would have prevented
them from engaging in any such conduct in the first place.
Today, while federal law enforcement has thus far led the effort to find and
charge participants who played a role in the attack of 1/6, there seems little doubt
that U.S. efforts to counter domestic violent extremism going forward will rely at
least as much or more on traditional state and local police. And existing problems
with state and local policing, as the country has spent the past year witnessing
acutely, are severe. Police reform proposals appropriately abound, many of which
are focused on eliminating the doctrine of qualified immunity, a legal rule that
has enabled many individual police who engage in misconduct to avoid civil
liability for unlawful actions.27 Indeed, ensuring that there exists an effective
mechanism to hold wrongdoers legally accountable is vital. But unless such afterthe-fact accountability reforms are coupled with policy-level reform, including
more robust officer vetting and training, we risk merely empowering a deeply
flawed system to take on an even more complex set of tasks – with, as we saw in
Abu Ghraib, the risk of making existing conflict that much worse.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to draw too much, or the wrong lessons, from our own recent history.
Especially with many of the laws and policies adopted in the wake of 9/11 still on
the books, their consequences still playing out, the risk is especially acute. But
with America’s latest counterterrorism efforts rapidly ratcheting up, the greater
harm would be in ignoring the common threads altogether. At a first approximation, it would be better to avoid making the same mistakes again.

25. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, COMMAND’S RESPONSIBILITY (2006).
26. Id.
27. George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021).

